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JUSTICE WILLIAM 0. DOUGLAS
WILEY A. BRANTON*
The principle of equality, which to this day this nation is struggling
to achieve, did not receive explicit constitutional recognition until 1868
when the fourteenth amendment became law. Using a double-negative
form of expression, the fourteenth amendment prohibits the state and,
by interpretation, the federal government' from denying any person
"the equal protection of the laws."
'2
This short provision has been the source of the most significant con-
stitutional developments of our time. Though significant developments
have occurred, we cannot allow ourselves to be lulled into a false sense
of security that such a provision might create. We must not for one
moment forget the "struggle," for it continues to this day. But we can
be thankful for a man like Justice Douglas,3 who has been character-
ized as "an egalitarian activist"; that is, a Justice willing to use
"whatever judicial tools [are] at hand--or may be created-to promote
the ends of equality of opportunity."4 This description is appropriate
because for thirty-six years Justice Douglas struck many libertarian
blows for the freedom of "underdogs": political, racial, or religious mi-
norities who have needed the Court's help to awaken the majority to
their messages.
Although some of us may compliment Justice Douglas, others have
* Dean, School of Law, Howard University; B.S., University of Arkansas, Pine Bluff, 1950;
J.D., University of Arkansas, 1953. Member of the Bars of the District of Columbia, Georgia, and
Arkansas; Director of Voter Education Project, Southern Regional Council, 1962-65; Special As-
sistant to United States Attorney General, 1965-67; Executive Director, United Planning Organi-
zation, 1967-69; Executive Director, Council United Civil Rights Leadership, 1963-65; Director of
Community and Social Action, Alliance for Labor Action, 1969-71; Partner, Dolphin, Branton,
Stafford and Weber, 1971-77; Of counsel, Walker, Kaplan and Mays, 1971-78.
I. Cf. Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954) (racial segregation of public schools in the
District of Columbia violates due process of law guaranteed by the fifth amendment).
2. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV provides in part:
No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of
citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or prop-
erty, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal
protection of the laws.
3. Justice Douglas was appointed to the Court by President Franklin Roosevelt in 1939. He
retired November 12, 1975, after serving more than 36 years, the longest term in the history of the
Court. Justice Douglas died in 1980. See C. BARNES, MEN OF THE SUPREME COURT: PROFILES
OF THE JUSTICES (1978).
4. Karst, Invidious Discrimination.- Justice Douglas and the Return of the "Natural-Law-Due-
Process Formula," 16 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 716, 717 (1969).
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regarded his attempts to promote equality as being unsupported by
constitutional law and a manifestation of what Justice Robert Jackson
once described (and he intended no compliment) as the work of "a cult
of libertarian judicial activists" who fail to pay proper respect to deci-
sions of the elected branches of government.5
At present, when the courts are being led by public opinion to face
up to the absence of equality in American society, it is easy to forget
that until very recently the Supreme Court was remarkably inhospi-
table to such claims.6 In spite of this, Justice Douglas' philosophy dem-
onstrates a concern for the welfare of all. He believed that governmen-
tal action directed against powerless minorities is invalid unless
justified, as it rarely can be, by an overriding interest of the state.7 Sim-
ilarly, governmental action that impairs the fundamental interests of a
particular group is also invalid unless justified by a compelling state
interest. 8
Practically speaking, the phrase "invidious discrimination" belongs
to Justice Douglas. In its modern usage, it comes from his opinion in
Skinner v. Oklahoma.' In Skinner, the Court struck down a law that
required the sterilization of a person who had been convicted three
times of a felony "involving moral turpitude," but exempted embezzle-
ment and other white collar offenses from the sterilization sanction.
Justice Douglas stated that interference with the fundamental right to
bear children required "strict scrutiny" by the Court;' ° that larceny,
one of the crimes for which the defendant was convicted, was "intrinsi-
5. R. JACKSON, THE SUPREME COURT IN THE AMERICAN SYSTEM OF GOVERNMENT 57
(1955).
6. See e.g., Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896); Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883).
7. See, e.g., Carter v. Jury Comm'n, 396 U.S. 320, 341 (1970) (Douglas, J., dissenting in
part) (he sought the remedy of proportioned representation of the races where challenged jury
commission had long record of racial discrimination in jury selection); Reitman v. Mulkey, 387
U.S. 369, 381 (1967) (Douglas, J., concurring opinion) (invalidating the state constitutional
amendment which had overturned a law forbidding racial discrimination in residential housing);
Bell v. Maryland, 378 U.S. 226, 242 (1964) (Douglas, J., concurring opinion) (using equal protec-
tion clause to reverse convictions of blacks arrested for sit-ins at lunch counters of privately owned
restaurants). See also Karst, supra note 4, at 736.
8. See, e.g. Bodie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 383 (1971) (Douglas, J., concurring in result)
(using equal protection clause to allow indigent welfare mothers to bring divorce actions without
payment of filing fee and costs); Levy v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68 (1968) (Douglas, J., majority
opinion) (invalidating state law that denied illegitimate children certain rights afforded legitimate
children); Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966) (Douglas, J.,t majority opinion)
(invalidating poll tax as applied to state elections on ground of denial of equal protection); Doug-
las v. California, 373 U.S. 353 (1963) (Douglas, J., majority opinion) (upholding right to ap-
pointed counsel for indigent criminal defendants on direct appeal); Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316
U.S. 535 (1942) (Douglas, J., majority opinion) (holding that forced sterilization of persons con-
victed three times of robbery or larceny, but not those convicted of embezzlement, was a violation
of equal protection).
9. 316 U.S. 535 (1942).
10. Id. at 541.
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cally" the same as embezzlement;" and that sterilization of a thief but
not a white collar embezzler violated the equal protection clause.'
2
Justice Douglas stated: "When the law lays an unequal hand on those
who have committed intrinsically the same quality of offense and steril-
izes one and not the other, it has made as invidious a discrimination as
if it had selected a particular race or nationality for oppressive
treatment."13
This decision may seem obvious in 1980, but in 1942 it was a notable
achievement to place the burden on a state to justify the line it drew
between larceny and embezzlement. In 1942 it was also a notable
achievement to invalidate a statute because the state could not meet
that burden. According to Justice Douglas, the fundamental right to
bear children includes the defendant's right to be free from sterilization
without a compelling justification. The statute could not be sustained
merely because the classification had a rational basis. ' 4 The Oklahoma
law was class legislation in the worst sense, discriminating invidiously
against criminals who were not sophisticated enough to do their steal-
ing in a genteel manner. I
A principal theme in Justice Douglas' equal protection opinions is
his desire to protect the despised, the defenseless, and especially the
penniless in American society. In Harper v. Virginia State Board of
Elections,I5 the Supreme Court held that payment of Virginia's annual
poll tax of $1.50 could not constitutionally be made a condition for
voting in state elections. Justice Douglas, writing for the majority of six
Justices, held that such a condition violated the equal protection clause
and invalidated the poll tax:
Wealth, like race, creed, or color, is not germane to one's ability to
participate intelligently in the electoral process. Lines drawn on the
basis of wealth or property, like those of race. . . are traditionally dis-
favored .... To introduce wealth or payment of a fee as a measure of
a voter's qualifications is to introduce a capricious or irrelevant factor.
The degree of the discrimination is irrelevant.' 6
Words like "irrational" or "capricious" came to be used, particularly
by Justice Douglas, as shorthand descriptions of the Court's conclusion
that the state's classification is unconstitutional. Irrationality or arbi-
trariness in the literal sense of an utter lack of justification is not re-
quired in order for a classification to be struck down. Rather, the label
of irrationality is affixed whenever the state fails to justify its discrimi-
11. Id. at 539.
12. Id. at 541.
13. Id.
14. Id. at 540.
15. 383 U.S. 663 (1966).
16. Id. at 668.
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nation to the satisfaction of a majority of the Court. In short, discrimi-
nation against a disadvantaged group (such as blacks) in relation to an
interest of great importance (such as voting) is, in the absence of com-
pelling justification, "invidious discrimination" which violates the
equal protection clause.'
7
Always following this theory, Justice Douglas was particularly sensi-
tive to financial barriers that prevent poor people from gaining access
to the courts. In Groin v. Illinois,8 the Court held that a state must
provide an indigent defendant with a free trial transcript if it is neces-
sary to appeal a criminal conviction. The Court held that a denial of a
transcript would be "invidious discrimination" in violation of the equal
protection clause. 9 Moreover, the Court stated that "[tihere can be no
equal justice where the kind of trial a man gets depends on the amount
of money he has."2 Justice Douglas joined in this opinion, and several
years later had an opportunity to extend its reach. In Douglas v. Cal-
fornia,2' the state was also required to provide counsel for an indigent
appellant in his first appeal from a criminal conviction.22 Writing for
the Court, Justice Douglas stated that the state's failure to provide
counsel drew "an unconstitutional line. . . between rich and poor,"23 a
line that amounted to "invidious discrimination."
The conclusion that a classification produces an "invidious discrimi-
nation" emerges from a three-part inquiry. The Court must decide (a)
whether the classification results in discrimination against a disadvan-
taged group; (b) whether that discrimination relates to an interest that
is "basic," "fundamental," or "critical"; and, assuming an affirmative
answer to these two questions, (c) whether the state's asserted justifica-
tion for the classification is sufficiently "compelling" to overcome the
presumptive invalidity implicit in the phrase "strict scrutiny."
24
Answers to these questions should be clear in cases involving racial
discrimination that is written into law.2" Most legislation has different
effects on various groups, and discrimination can be found in almost
anything the government does or fails to do. Therefore, the important
question is what groups are to be called "disadvantaged."
The best explanation of judicial solicitude for the disadvantaged has
17. See text accompanying note 24 infra.
18. 351 U.S. 12, 19 (1956).
19. Id. at 19.
20. Id.
21. 372 U.S. 353 (1963).
22. Id. at 355-56.
23. Id. at 357.
24. G. GUNTHER, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 671-72, 705 (10th ed.
1980).
25. Similarly, alienage is a suspect category. See Takahasi v. Fish & Game Comm'n, 334
U.S. 410 (1948).
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come not from the Supreme Court, but from Judge J. Skelley Wright in
his often-cited opinion in Hobson v. Hansen. 26 Judge Wright stated
that the courts look with "close scrutiny" at legislation that adversely
affects the basic interests of disadvantaged groups:
[This is because of] the judicial attitude toward legislative and adminis-
trative judgments. Judicial deference to these judgments is predicated
in the confidence courts have that they are just resolutions of conflicting
interests. This confidence is often misplaced when the vital interests of
the poor and of racial minorities are involved. These groups are not
always assured of a full and fair hearing through the ordinary political
processes, not so much because of the chance of outright bias, but be-
cause of the abiding danger that the power structure-a term which
need carry no disparaging or abusive overtones-may incline to play
little heed to even the deserving interests of a politically voiceless and
invisible minority.27
Furthermore, a good measure of outright bias is built into every situa-
tion of inequality. The "haves" will seldom be inclined to make the
"have nots" more equal by sharing with them.
How then should a disadvantaged class of illegitimates be character-
ized? In Levy v. Louisiana,28 Levy, on behalf of five illegitimate chil-
dren, brought an action for the wrongful death of their mother. The
lower court held that the phrase "surviving child" as used in the statute
did not include an illegitimate child. The denial of a right of recovery
was "based on morals and general welfare [which] discourage[d] bring-
ing children into the world out of wedlock."
29
Iv an opinion written by Justice Douglas, the Supreme Court held
that the statute's denial of a right of recovery by illegitimate children
creates an "invidious discrimination" contravening the equal protec-
tion clause of the fourteenth amendment.30 This is because legitimacy
or illegitimacy has no relation to the nature of the wrong allegedly in-
flicted on the mother.3' This reasoning suggests that illegitimate chil-
dren, or even their natural parents, can be called disadvantaged in the
political sense suggested by Judge Wright.3 2 While they may be nu-
26. 269 F. Supp. 401 (D.D.C. 1967), afrdand mod#'ied sub nor. Smuck v. Hobson, 408 F.2d
175 (D.C. Cir. 1969).
27. Id. at 507-08. Chief Justice Warren made a similar point in a voting rights case, Kramer
v. Union Free School Dist. No. 15, 395 U.S. 621, 628 (1969):
The presumption of constitutionality and the approval given "rational" classifications in
other types of enactments are based on an assumption that the institutions of state govern-
ment are structured so as to represent fairly all the people. However, when the challenge to
the statute is in effect a challenge to this basic assumption, the assumption can no longer serve
as the basis of presuming constitutionality.
28. 391 U.S. 68 (1968).
29. Id. at 70.
30. Id. at 72.
31. Id.
32. See text accompanying notes 26-27 supra.
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merous, their political strength is near zero. More persuasive, however,
is an explanation of this case that takes into account the possibility that
the legislative classification was a covert form of racial discrimination.
In United States v. Carolene Products Co., 33 it was suggested that
"prejudice against discrete and insular minorities" who do not have
adequate access to the political process should call for "exacting judi-
cial scrutiny."34 Justice Douglas, however, did not rest exclusively on
judicial precedent; he made good use-perhaps more than any other
Justice.during that time--of empirical data and social science findings
to demonstrate how disdavantaged the poor in fact are.35
The philosophical underpinnings of Justice Douglas' egalitarian
view are important and should be made explicit. It is not that "equal-
ity" is synonymous with "justice" or is capable of providing answers to
the ultimate question of what rights individuals should have in society.
The point is that once society grants or accords certain rights or mate-
rial benefits to some, the concept of equality informs us that these are,
at least presumptively, valid criteria of what rights or material benefits
society should grant to others. Like most general principles, this one
does not allow for every variation in the facts. However, the premise is
sound: if government treats one group one way, another group has a
prima facie claim to equal treatment.36
The battle is not over in the development of doctrine under the equal
protection clause, but we can thank Justice Douglas for refining its
analysis so that the Court could realistically take into account the
varied forms of discrimination.
There is irony in recognizing Justice Douglas' doctrinal leadership.
He was a Justice who was supposed to be so "result-oriented" as to care
nothing for the articulation of principle. But his legacy to us in the
equal protection area is precisely a legacy of doctrinal principle. True,
he often painted with a broad brush. When one wishes to stake out a
broad principle, that is quite appropriate, and may even be necessary.
As well as any other Justice of his time, Justice Douglas told us what
the factors were that caused him to decide as he did. That is surely the
most important test of a good opinion; if the opinion also can integrate
and consolidate doctrine, so much the better. But it is not easy both to
consolidate and to innovate in the same breath. Justice Douglas was
doctrinally innovative, and he usually explained the bases of his inno-
vations so that neither a lower court nor a legislator would have diffi-
culty understanding them. Constitutional growth demands such
Justices .. .
33. 304 U.S. 144 (1938).
34. Id. at 152 n.4.
35. See, e.g., Bell v. Maryland, 378 U.S. 226, 242 (1964).
36. See Karst, supra note 4, at 717.
37. Karst, Justice Douglas and the Equal Protection Clause, 51 IND. L.J. 14, 16 (1975).
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For his egalitarian vision of America, and for the doctrinal under-
pinnings he supplied to our egalitarian movements, we are grateful.
Justice Douglas was a judicial activist, a great civil libertarian, and one
of the foremost defenders of human rights. Without question, he de-
serves a place on the list of great jurists.
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